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TAX DISALLOWANCE OF LOSS ON SALES
BETWEEN RELATED COMPANIES OR INDIVIDUALS
SEYMOUR S. MINTZ *
Nowadays, tax factors necessarilh affect the form, substance and timing
of sales of property. It is the purpose of this paper to discuss some of the
special tax considerations in sales made within a group of related companies
or related individuals.
Ordinarily a corporation is treated for federal income tax purposes as an
entity separate from its subsidiaries, from its individual or corporate stock-
holders, and from other corporations controlled by" the same stockholders.
This general rule is subject to a number of possible exceptions. One of these
relates to the allowance of losses on sales or exchanges within the group of
related corporations and individuals. The losses may be disallowed by specific
statutory provisions (T.R.C. § 24(b)). or by reason of the concepts of good
faith and business purpose, implicit in the Internal Revenue Code. requiring
that the transaction be not an empty transfer of legal title, but a real sale, mark-
ing with finality the realization of an economic loss. The same problem as to
allowance of loss arises upon transfers between husband and wife (or their
companies) and between other taxpayers closely related by blood, by friend-
ship, or by business or other interests, in fact wherever the relationship and
circumstances are such as to suggest that the transferred property still may
be under the domination and control of the seller, or that its fruits still may be
enjoyed by the latter.
In determining whether loss will be allowed Oil a sale between related
taxpayers, § 24(b) should be considered fif:st. If its terms are applicable.
the loss will be disallowed, and the study need go no further. If § 24(b) is not
applicable to the transaction, additional analysis is needed, since the loss
may nevertheless be disallowed because the transaction lacks good faith or
business purpose.
Finally, §§ 45 and 129, 1.R.C., should be considered. Section 45 authorizes
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to allocate losses within a controlled
* Seymour S. Mintz is a member of the District of Columbia bar and a partner of
Itogan & Hartson, Washington, D.C.; Chairman, Committee on Taxation of Earned
income. Taxation Section. American Bar Association: Member, Committee on Taxation.
Bar Association of District of Columbia; Author: BASIC CoNcEPTS OF TAXABLE I NCOME:
ENTERTAINERS AND THE CAPITAL GAINS TAX; Co-author: WILLS, GITns AND ESTATE
PLANNING UNDER THE 1948 Rv.,_'F. ACT.
The first part of this paper is to appear in a book on tax procedures to be published
Iv Prentice-Hall.
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group but not to disallow the losses.1 Section 129 provides in certain instances
for the full or partial disallowance of a deduction, credit or other allowance
which a taxpayer attempts to enjoy through the acquisition, on or after
October 8, 1940, of the control of a corporation or the property of a corpora-
tion, the principal purpose of the acquisition being evasion or avoidance of
federal income or excess profits tax by securing the benefit of the aforesaid
deduction, credit or other allowance. Both §§ 45 and 129 are outside the
scope of this paper.
SECTION 24(b)
Under this section, no deduction is allowed in respect of losses from
sales or exchanges of property directly or indirectly between-
Members of a family. A corporation and an individual owning (di-
The grantor and fiduciary rectly or indirectly) more than 50% in value
of a trust, of its outstanding stock (not applicable to
The fiduciaries of two distributions in liquidation),
trusts, if the same person is Two corporations, if the same individual
grantor of each. owns (directly or indirectly) more than 507o
The fiduciary and benefici- in value of the outstanding stock of each,
ary of the same trust, provided either corporation was a personal
holding company for its preceding taxable
year (not applicable to distributions in liqui-
dation).
Section 24(b) is inapplicable to transactions between a stockholder and a
corporation, or between two corporations in which the same individual holds
stock, if the stockholder owns in each instance precisely 50 per cent 2 (or less)
of the stock, subject to the stock ownership rules discussed below.
"MEMBERS OF A FAMILY"
Section 24(b) (2) (D) states that the family of an individual shall
include only his brothers and sisters (whether by the whole or half blood),
spouse, ancestors, and lineal descendants. This list is important for two
reasons: firstly, losses on sales or exchanges between "members of a family"
are disallowed; secondly, an individual is considered as owning the stock
owned, directly or indirectly, by or for his "family" (as well as by certain
other persons), under the stock ownership rules below analyzed. These
rules determine the circumstances in which stock in a corporation, a party
to a sale or exchange, is to be considered as owned by a person other than
the actual owner."
1. General Industries Corp., 35 B.T.A. 615 (1937); A. G. Nelson Paper Co., P-H
1944 TC ME, DEC. 44,286 (1944).
2. See Hewitt Rubber Co. of Pittsburgh, P-H 1947 TC MEm. Dpc. 47,317 (1947).
3. Lewis L. Fawcett, 3 T.C. 308 (1944) aff'd, 149 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1945).
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The operation of § 24(b) is not affected by the fact that the purchasing
member of the family occupies a special tax category in respect of the prop-
erty, such as the status of a dealer in securities. 4
RULES FOR DETERMINING OWNERSHIP OF STOCK IN A CORPORATION
WHICH IS A PARTY TO A SALE OR EXCHANGE
Section 24(b) disallows losses from sales or exchanges of property
between certain persons, regardless of the nature of the property.5 There
are, however, specific provisions as to when a particular kind of property,
i.e., corporate stock, owned by one person shall, in applying the section,
be considered as being owned by another. These provisions are complex, and
their application to individual cases should be carefully studied. The provisions
may be illustrated as follows:
Example One. A owns 1% of the stock of a corporation. His wife, son,
father, grandfather and partner each owns 10%. A is considered as owning
51% of the stock, and loss on a sale between A and the corporation will be
disallowed.
Exampie Two. A owns none of the corporation's stock. His wife, son,
father, grandfather and partner each owns 11%. A is considered as owning
only 44% of the stock, the amount owned by his partner being ignored in these
circumstances. Hence § 24(b) is not applicable to a transaction between A
and the corporation,
Example Three. A individually owns none of X corporation's stock.
He and an otherwise unrelated individual, however, own equally all the bene-
ficial interests in another corporation, a partnership, an estate and a trust,
each of which owns 20% of the stock of X corporation. The remaining
20% is owned by a member of A's family. A is considered as owning 60% of
X's stock (half of the stock owned by the partnership, estate, trust and the
other corporation, and all of the stock owned by the member of A's family).
The result would be the same if a partner of A instead of a member of A's
family owned the remaining 20%.
Example Four. A owns 50% of the stock of a corporation. His wife's
father owns the other 50%. Hence A's wife is considered as owning 100%,
but her husband and father are considered as owning only 50% each.
Example Five. A and his partner each own 50% of the stock of a cor-
poration. Each is considered as owning more than 50% (i.e., 100%) and
therefore § 24(b) is applicable to transactions between A and the corporation,
or between the partner and the corporation. The section is not applicable,
4. Claire S. Strauss, P-H 1943 TC MEs. DEc. 43,217 (1943) (the taxpayer
sold securities to her husband, a dealer in securities, claiming that his occupation made
§ 24(b) inapplicable. The loss was disallowed.)
5. Lewis L. Fawcett, note 3, su pra.
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however, to transactions between A and his partner, or between A's brother
and the partner, or between A's brother and the corporation.6
In compliance with the stock ownership rules of § 24(h), it has been
held that each of two brothers, who made separate purchases from a corpora-
tion, was to be considered as owning the stock of the other and the stock of
his father and his other brothers, in determining whether he was the owner
of more than 50 per cent of the seller's outstanding stock.7 The decision
made it clear that two individuals may be considered as owning the same
shares at the same time.
TIME OF I)ETERMINING STOCK OWNERSHIP
W\here the corporate stock itself is transferred between corporation
and stockholder, leaving the latter with not more than 50 per cent stock
ownership at completion of the transaction, the courts have held that the
stock ownership is to be determined as of the time the sale is made and not
as of the time the transaction is completed.8 This view has even been applied
to disallow the loss in a case in which the stockholder transferred all his stock
to the corporation, in a transaction which took the form of a sale. 9
VALUATION OF CORPORATE STOCK
In the case of a sale or exchange between stockholder and corporation,
or between two corporations, it is actual or constructive ownership by the
stockholder of more than 50 per centum in 'oalue of the outstanding stock,
which may bring § 24(b) into operation. This test is also laid down in
I.R.C. § 501 (a) (2) relating to personal holding companies, and in I.R.C.
§ 331 (a) (2), relating to foreign personal holding companies. Hence decisions
under each of these sections ultimately ,may be of aid in construing the
foregoing language in § 24(b).
At present writing, only two cases have involved the value element in
the above-quoted language in § 24(b). In one,10 the taxpayer clained that
the section was inapplicable because all the outstanding stock was worthless.
The court disposed of the case without a decision on this point. In another,"
the taxpayer's holdings of preferred stock would represent only 49.36 per
cent in value of the outstanding stock if it were found that the corporation
6. A literal reading of the statute might result in disallowance of a loss between
A's brother and the corporation, but the regulations (Example (1) under U.S. Treas.
Reg. 111, § 29.24-6(d)) (1943) adopt the view above illustrated.
7. Hosch Brothers Co., 3 T.C. 279 (1944). See, also, Tri-Borough Transportation
Co., P-H 1946 TC MEM. DEC. 46,049 (1946).
8. WV. A. Drake. 3 TC. 33 (1944). aff'd, 145 F.2d 365 (10th Cir. 1944).
9. Bernard Rubin, P-H 1946 TC ME.m. DFw. fj 46,075 (1946).
10. Butler Consolidated Coal Co., 6 T.C. 183 (1946).
I1. \Volf Bergman, P-H 1947 TC ME.ii. Drc, 47,285 (1947).
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possessed a certain amount of good will, enhancing the value of its common
stock, none of which was owned by the taxpayer. The court concluded that the
existence of good will was not proved, and therefore disallowed the loss.
MFANING OF "SALE OR EXCIIANGE"
The words "sale or exchange" as used in § 24(b) are broad in scope.
Hence they apply to many transactions which the unwary might not consider
as being within the section.
In one case, 12 part of the estate of the taxpayer's father, consisting of
securities and cash, was distributed to a joint account for the equal benefit
of the taxpayer, his mother and two sisters. Some years later, the taxpayer
withdrew from the joint account, and received therefrom in cash an amount
representing the value of his interest. This amount was less than his cost basis.
The loss was disallowed, on the ground that his receipt of cash (in excess of
one-fourth of the cash in the account) resulted from a "sale" to his mother
and sisters of his share in the securities held in the account.
The foregoing result could have been avoided, of course, if the joint
account had been terminated by distribution in kind to each of the members,
followed by the taxpayer's sale of his securities to an outsider. Or the joint
account could have been maintained, but all of its assets reduced to cash before
the taxpayer's withdrawal.
The withdrawal from a partnership also may amount to a sale, loss from
which is disallowed by § 24(b).3
In the case of il. Conley Co.,"' the taxpayer had funds on deposit in a
bank which closed in 1931. In December, 1939, the amount of the final dis-
tribution to be paid to holders of claims was known. Because the taxpayer
desired to write off its loss in 1939, it sold its claim to the holder of 69 per cent
of its stock for $12,050, receiving his promissory note. Soon thereafter, the
liquidator of the bank paid $12,050 to the taxpayer's stockholder, who in turn
paid off his note to the taxpayer. On its return, the taxpayer reported a loss
on the sale of a capital asset, but later claimed a bad debt deduction. The Tax
Court held that the loss was from a sale, and was disallowed by § 24(b).
If the taxpayer had not gone through the formal transaction with its stock-
holder, it probably could have taken the bad debt deduction in 1939.
Another transaction deemed to be a sale or exchange under § 24(b) was
one in which a taxpayer, owner of a one-sixth undivided interest in un-
profitable real estate, gave a quitclaim deed to his brother in return for the
12. Henry V. B. Smith, 5 T.C. 323 (1945).
13. Nathan Blum, 5 T.C. 702 (1945).
14. P-H 1943 TC MEM. DEC. 43,008 (1943).
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latter's assumption of all the taxpayer's liabilities in respect of the transferred
property."6
The transfer of property in payment of, or for credit upon, a debt owed
by the transferor, is a sale or exchange within the meaning of § 24(b).16
SALES OR EXCHANGES INDIRECTLY BETWEEN RELATED
ENTITIES OR INDIVIDUALS
The statutory language disallows losses from sales or exchanges of
property directly or indirectly between certain persons. If Smith sells 100
shares of corporate stock to a straw man from whom Smith's wife buys
the same shares, it is considered that there was a sale indirectly between
Smith and his wife, and loss thereon is disallowed. Suppose, however, that
Smith sells his shares upon the stock exchange, and his wife buys upon the
exchange a like number of shares in the same corporation. Under facts like
these, the Tax Court held in the McWilliams case 17 that the husband did not
sell to his wife but to an unknown purchaser. The circuit court reversed,1 '
stating that the transaction was an indirect sale between members of a family,
because at the end of the transaction the parties "were in the same position
as if they had dealt directly with each other as buyer and seller," having trans-
ferred fungible property 19 from one to another at a substantially unchanged
price and in accordance with a pre-existing design. The circuit court was
upheld by the Supreme Court.0 Its opinion is discussed in detail in a later
section of this paper.
The Tax Court has held that there was a sale indirectly between mem-
bers of a family where a husband bought from a bank certain stock owned by
his wife and pledged by her nine yeats earlier, the sale being viewed as having
been made under her authority." The court reached the same conclusion
as to a sheriff's sale of a farm to mortgagees, the taxpayer's brothers and
sisters, who had brought foreclosure proceedings which the taxpayer unsuc-
15. Charles J. Stamler, 45 B.T.A. 37 (1941). Cf. P-H 1940 B.T.A. MEM. DEc.
40,613 (1940).
16. See the opinion of the circuit court in Lakeside Irrigation Co. v. Commissioner,
note 26, infra; and Stephenson Land Co., P-H 1946 TC MEm. DEc. ff 46,108 (1946).
17. 5 T.C. 623 (1945). Accord: Pauline Ickelheimer, 45 B.T.A. 478 (1941), aff'd,
132 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1943); and August Kohn, P-H 1945 TC MEM. Dsc. IT 45,351(1945), re/d, 158 F.2d 32 (4th Cir. 1946).
18. 158 F.2d 637 (6th Cir, 1946).
19. The circuit court's opinion included the following statement: "No material
change was made in the property rights held by the broker for the taxpayers, for a
certificate for the same number of shares, although printed upon different paper and
bearing a different number, represents precisely the same kind and value of property
as does another certificate for a like number of shares of stock in the same corpora-
tion. Richardson v. Shaw, 209 U.S. 365, 378; Gorman v. Littlefield, Trustee, 229 U.S.
19, 23."
20. 331 U.S. 694 (1947).
21. Charles E. Cooney, P-H 1942 TC M,. Dc. 4Z589 (1942).
TAX DISALLOWANCE OF LOSS ON SALES
cessfully contested.2 2 In a brief but pungent dissent, three judges pointed out
that the sale was not made by the taxpayer but by the sheriff.
TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN A PARTNERSHIP AND A CORPORATION
CONTRO.LED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE PARTNERSHIP
Closely related to the problem of sales or exchanges indirectly between
related entities or individuals is the matter of a sale between a partnership
and a corporation controlled by the members of the partnership. Section
24(b) (1) (B) generally disallows loss on a sale or exchange between an
individual and a corporation more than 50 per cent of the stock of which
is owned by such individual. Does the term "individual" include a partnership?
In the Whitney case,23 the Tax Court indicated that it did not, but the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the decision.2 4
The facts in the Whitney case were as follows: The thirteen members
of a general banking partnership (J. P. Morgan & Co.) decided that their
New York business should be incorporated as a trust company. The partner-
ship sold assets, some at a gain and some at a loss, to a newly organized
corporation (J. P. Morgan & Co., Incorporated), 78.2 per cent of the stock
of which was owned by the partners and their relatives. If each individual
member of the partnership had made the sale jointly with every other member,
the loss would have been disallowed. The circuit court believed the result
must be the same where the partnership made the sale. It considered that
a differentiation between the aforesaid two sales was without "substance or
reality" in view of the statutory method of treating partnerships for federal
income tax purposes and in the light of the legislative purpose of § 24(b).
GAINS ON SALES: SEPARATION OF GAINS AND LOSSES
IN THE SAME TRANSACTION
The fact that losses from certain sales or exchanges would be disallowed
by § 24(b) does not serve to exempt from taxation any gains realized on
such transactions.
25
The section, moreover, cannot be avoided by offsetting within a single
transaction gains and losses on separate pieces of property. In a leading
case, a corporation, at one time and in one transaction, sold to a stockholder,
considered as owning more than 50 per cent of its stock, four blocks of securi-
ties at market prices which resulted in gains as to two of the blocks and
losses as to the other two, there being a small net gain on the entire trans-
action. The commissioner was upheld in treating the transfer of each block
22. Thomas Zacek, 8 T.C. 1056 (1947).
23. George Whitney, 8 T.C. 1019 (1947).
24. 169 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied. 335 U.S. 892 (1948).
25. I.T. 3334, C.B. 1939-2, 180.
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as a separate sale, with the result that the losses could not. by reason of
§ 24(b), be used to offset the gains.26 This conclusion has been reached in other
stock sales cases,27 as well as in a case involving the sale of real estate.28
It is true that the above-mentioned cases merely lay down a general
rule, for the courts concede that there may be instances in which separate
properties could be substantially integrated, so that their sale would be
an indivisible transaction. These instances, however, appear to be rare.
The clearest case, of course, would be one of physical integration, as where
two separately-acquired pieces of real estate are consolidated by the erection of
a building partly upon each. A similar exception might involve a set of matched
goblets, tapestries or other items having an aggregate status and value entirely
distinct from its separately-acquired components.2 9 A more unusual case, pre-
senting not physical but practical integration, might be one in which the buyer.
with business justification, refused except upon a lump sum basis to purchase
or even to bid for certain assets, whose separate market value could not be
satisfactorily determined.
BoNA FItE CIHARACTER OF TRANSACTION UNDER § 24(b)
Enough already has been said to make it obvious that, if its literal terms
are Met, § 24(b) will apply despite the fact that the transaction is constlni-
mated in good faith and for a fair consideration."
The miost authoritative indication to this effect was given by the Suprene
Court in the AfcWilfams case.31 There the Court stated that § 24(b) applies
whether the sale is fictitious or real, since Congress evidently believed the
individuals and entities described therein had a "near-identity of economic
interests" and hence that "even legally genuine intra-group transfers were not
thought to result, usually, in economically genuine realizations of loss."
26. Lakeside Irrigation Co., 41 B.T.A. 892 (1940), aff'd, 128 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1942)
cert. denied, 317 U.S. 666 (1942).
27. M. F. Reddington, Inc., P-H 1942 B.T.A. MEat. DEc. 42,101 (1942), uff'd.
131 F.2d 1014 (2d Cir. 1942); B. 0. Mahaffey, 1 T.C. 176 (1942), rev'd on another
point, 140 F.2d 879 (8th Cir. 1944) ; W. A. Drake, Inc., note 8, supra; Morris Invest-
ment Corp., 5 T.C. 583 (1945), aff'd, 156 F.2d 748 (3d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329
U.S. 788 (1946). See, also, I.T. 3334, note 25, sripra.
28. William F. Krahl, 9 T.C. 862 (1947).
,9. The Tax Court would not necessarily hold that the articles had been integrated
in this hypothetical case. In Krahl, note 28, supra, it held that there had been tno
integration although (1) the taxpayer had purchased the second piece of real property
to protect the first piece against physical damage: (2) ownership of the two pieces
would have permitted him to replace the existing buildings with one fronting on two
streets; and (3) the aggregate sale value of the two properties was greater if sold as a
unit than if sold separately.
30. See Nathan Bluin, note 13, stpra: Arizona Publishing Co., 9 T.C. 85 (1947);
Claire S. Strauss, note 4, supra: Thomas Zacek, note 22, su pra: l.akesidr Irrigation
Co.. note 26, supra; M. F. Reddington. Inc., note 27, stpra; Henry V. B. Smith, note
12, supra; Charles J. Stanler, note 15, supra; M. Conley Co., note 14, supra. In one
case, Jordan C. Skinner, 47 B.T.A. 624 (1942), the amount received by the seller from
his brother was almost twice as much as that offered by anyone else.
31. See note 17. srpro.
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BASIS OF P"ROPERTY FOLLOWING LOSS DSALLOWA.NC1. UNDER § 24(b)
The loss disallowance tinder § 24(b) is permanent, not temporary, for
the purchaser takes at his cost, there being no provision for carry-over of
the seller's basis.32 Nor can the parties rescind the transaction and thereby re-
vest the old basis, if the sale originally was in good faith.33
METHODS OF AVOIDING SECTION 24(b) PE-NALTY
(a) In general.
As already indicated, the bona fide character of a transaction affords
no immunity against § 24(b), for this section contains a rigid statutory
formula. Because of such formula, avoidance is both "easy" and "impossible"
of accomplishtlent, depending upon what one means by avoidance. For ex-
ample, a sale to an outsider will "'avoid" the § 24(b) penalty, i.e., loss disal-
lowance. This sale, however, does not avoid, but actually complies with the
statutory mandate, for the mandate is that a sale to an outsider is free of the
section, the identity of such a buyer being accepted for purposes of the section
as the proof of the seller's economic loss.
Regardless of rhetoric, it is clear that the seller will not be concerned with
§ 24(b) if sales at a loss are made to outsiders and only sales at a gain are
made within the related group of taxpayers.
Means of avoiding § 24(b) penalty in several specific types of transac-
tions also have been suggested in preceding sections of this article. The follow-
ing paragraphs contain suggestions as to other possible steps.
(b) Sales of property to certain relatives.
Without risk of loss disallowance tinder § 24(b), property may be sold
to a relative who is not a brother, sister, spouse, ancestor or lineal descendant
of the seller. If, moreover, the sale is otherwise in good faith and for adequate
32. In this respect, § 24(b) is harsher than the wash sales provision (§ 118). See§ 113(a)(10). The authors of MONTGOMERY'S FEDERAL TAXES, CORPORATIONS AND
PAwrNERSHIPS, 1948-49, make the following observation as to § 113(a) (10) : ". . . a
taxpayer may sell securities to a controlled corporation or a member of his family and
purchase substantially similar securities within 30 days thereafter. The loss would be
disallowed under both section 1 I8(a) and section 24(b)(1). The authors believe.however. that the provisions of section 113(a) (10) should be controlling and the basis
of the property sold should be carried forward, since the loss is nondeductible under
section 118(a) regardless of the fact that it is likewise nondeductible under another
section." (Vol. 1, p. 351).
33. Herberich, Hall, Harter Agency, Inc., P-H 1944 TC MEM. DEC. 44,146(1944). If, under principles discussed later in this paper, a loss is disallowed because
the transfer is deemed a sham, one would expect it to be considered a sham for all
purposes, so that the taxpayer could re-establish his original basis by reversing the
transaction. See Thai v. Commissioner, 142 F.2d 874 (6th Cir. 1944). However, if a
transfer is deemed a sham because the taxpayer does not thereby realize loss in
economic fact, although he does in form, the taxpayer may find himself bound by the
form of his transaction. Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 477 (1940). Cf.: MOrToOMERY'S
FEDERAL TAXES, CORPORATIONS AND PARTNERSHIPS, 1948-49, Vol. 1. p. 707: RABETN
AND JOHNsoN, FEDERAL INco.rM. AND GiFT TAXATMN. E1 § 2, p. 610a (1947).
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consideration, any loss thereon will be allowed as well under the concepts of
good faith and business purpose discussed toward the end of this article.
A son-in-law (or daughter-in-law) of an individual is not his lineal de-
scendant and is not otherwise within the family definition in § 24(b).34
Care must be taken, however, to insure in the case of a sale to a son-in-law
or daughter-in-law that the transaction is neither in substance nor in law a
sale to the seller's descendant. In the Simister case,3 5 the taxpayers sold a
farm to their son-in-law and daughter. The Bureau of Internal Revenue con-
tended that the buyers took as joint tenants, that each was vested with the
property in its entirety, and, since one of the buyers was a lineal descendant
of the sellers, that the entire loss should be disallowed. The Tax Court found
it unnecessary to deal with the joint tenancy problem, for it concluded that
under the applicable state law the buyers were equal tenants in common and
hence that only one-half the loss was disallowed. The joint tenancy problem
is as yet undecided, although one commentator has suggested that the court
probably would have reached the same conclusion as it did in the case of
the tenancy in common.36 Others believe the court implied that the entire loss
would have been disallowed had the buyers taken as joint tenants. s7
The Tax Court extended the reasoning of the Simister case to one in-
volving community property in Arizona Publishing Co.88 There the taxpayer
corporation sold real property to X who with his wife owned, as community
property, 27 per cent of the corporation's stock. X's sister and her husband
owned, as community property, 54 per cent of the corporation's stock. Since
X paid the purchase price of the real property out of community funds, the
property was deemed to have been sold to X and his wife as community prop-
erty. Pointing out that under Arizona law a wife's title in community property
is the equal of the husband's, the court held that loss was disallowed as to the
portion of the property (one-half) sold to X, because he actually owned 13Y
per cent of the corporate stock, and constructively owned his wife's 13% per
cent and his sister's 27 per cent, or a total of 54 per cent. The portion of the
loss attributable to the property sold to X's wife was allowed (the price having
been found to be fair), because her actual and constructive stock ownership
included only the stock actually owned by her (13 per cent) and that actually
owned by her husband (13Y per cent).
A variation of the son-in-law transaction occurred in the Saul case.39
Walter Saul gave to his daughters money which their husbands used to buy
stock. The seller was Walter's brother. On these facts, the'Bureau claimed that
34. Fervel Topek, 9 T.C. 763 (1947).
35. 4 T.C. 470 (1944).
36. TAX BnoMmTER, Vol. 2, para. 21.
37. RABKIN AND JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION. S3 § 7
(1947).
38. See note 30, supra.
39. P-H 1947 TC MEss. DEc. 11 47,178 (1947)
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the result was the same as if the stock had been sold to Walter who thereafter
had given it to his sons-in-law. The Tax Court held that the sale was not be-
tween brothers, but between a seller and his brother's sons-in-law, who were
not members of the seller's family. The Tax Court said: 40
We cannot agree with the respondent that the sale was in effect a sale to
the petitioner's brother. There is no showing that the purchasers did not
acquire full title or that they held the stock for the benefit of Walter Saul.
If the result intended by all the parties was to place the stock in the hands
of the sons-in-law of the petitioner's brother the parties had the right to
choose the method actually adopted, a gift of the funds by Walter Saul to.
his daughters followed by the purchase of the stock by their husbands, in
preference to the alternative method of a purchase by Walter Saul of the
stock followed by a gift of the stock. This is not a case of doing indirectly
what the parties cannot, without foregoing the deduction, do directly, but
merely a choice between two alternative methods of accomplishing the same
end. That they choose the method which results in a tax saving is their priv-
ilege. There is nothing inherently wrong in such a choice.
Similarly, the brother-in-law or sister-in-law of an individual is not a
member of his family under § 24(b). In a claimed sale to a brother's wife.
however, it was found that she was merely the nominal purchaser, her hus-
band (the seller's brother) being the real buyer.' 1
An individual also may deal with his uncles, aunts and cousins, without
§ 24(b) penalty.
(c) Sales and purchases upon the Stock Exchange.
The McWilliams decision 42 effectively stopped avoidance of § 24(b)
through prearranged stock exchange purchases and sales within a group of
related individuals or entities. There is some danger, however, that revenue
agents may attempt to invoke the § 24(b) penalty by extending this decision to
cases involving materially different facts. Hence rather close scrutiny of the
court's opinion is desirable. 48
In general, losses from sales within the groups designated in § 24(b)
are disallowed because Congress thought that these sales did not actually
terminate the investment. While in the McWilliams case the members of the
group sold to, and bought from, unknown persons, and stock certificates were
received different from those sold, § 24(b) was held applicable because
40. Id. at 47-646.
41. 0. Phil Nordling, P-H 1947 TC MEM. DEc. % 47,046 (1947), aff'd, 166 F.2d 703
(1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 817 (1948). To the same effect is Charles J. Stamler (note
15, supra).
42. See note 20, supra.
43. The text discussion of the McWillildms decision closely follows the thoughts
expressed by this'writer in REvIEw or SUPREME CouRT's TAx DEcisioNs, 1946-7 Term,
Part 29 of Practical Aspects of Federal Taxation (Bureau of National Affairs), pp.
16-24; and IMPLICATIONS OF THE MCWILLIAMS CASE, N.Y.U. INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL
TAXATION, pp. 1134-1139 (6th Annual ed. 1947).
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it was prearranged that the respective members of the group would buy and
sell identical property. The prearrangement was clear on the basis of the fol-
lowing facts: The properties of the several members of the group were
managed by one of them; orders to buy and sell were issued simultaneously.
and were isued to the same broker; the orders were to buy at as close to the
sales price as possible; the sale and purchase were promptly consummated.
each on the same day; the amount of money received by the selling member
of the group and that paid by the purchasing member differed only in the
amount of broker's coniiuissions and excise taxes; the transactions were part
of a pattern which the group had followed on a number of occasions ; the broker
was advised that the purpose of the transactions was to establish tax loss.
Several of the listed prearrangement factors have only corroborative sig-
nificance. These include the factor as to a pattern of similar transactions, and
the disclosure as to tax motivation. Other factors, including single manage-
ment of the transactions, were essential to this particular kind of prearrange-
ment; but in some instances prearrangement might be proven by showing a
tacit understanding among the members of the group. Prearrangement like-
wise was implicit in the employment of a single broker, and in the specific
orders given him as to price. The use of separate brokers, however, would not
alter the situation, if other essential elements of prearrangement were pres-
ent. It is believed, in other words, that in regard to the aforementioned factors
at least, the courts probably will not closely limit the McWilliams doctrine to
the precise facts of such case.
Other elements, such as the time factor, are of more than casual sig-
nificance. The orders to buy and to sell were simultaneously issued, and were
executed on the same day. It is clear, however, that the courts will not restrict
the MclVilliams principle precisely to these facts.4 Suppose, on the other
hand, that a full 30-day interval elapsed between the sale by one member of
the group and the purchase by another. It might be argued that in such cir-
cumstances the loss should be allowed, since the seller would be allowed the
loss if he repurchased after 30 days. If § 24(b) were complementary to § 118
(the wash sales provision), the loss would be allowed. Technically, however.
the aforesaid sections are independent. Hence it is concluded only that, if Con-
gress had studied this in detail, it might have said that 30 days as effectively
breaks the continuity of the investment when a group is involved as when one
person is involved, and therefore that as a practical matter the deduction
should be allowed in the hypothetical case. In a marginal note, the Court re-
44. This is indicated by the Supreme Court's statement as to why it granted
certiorari. It said it did so because the decisions of the circuit courts in AfcVilliamj
and Kohn (note 17, surpra) conflicted with those in Ickelheimer (note 17, supra). In
both the latter cases, the sale by one member of the group and the purchase by another
occurred on successive days.
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fused to express any views as to such case, involving a time interval of 30
days or longer.
It is difficult to say that one member of the group sold to another unless
the consideration paid by the one and that received by the other is approxi-
mately the same. The price difference which will permit the group to escape
§ 24(b) is difficult to compute by any general yardstick, just as is the time in-
terval. Interpretative color will be lent each of these vital elements by the other
factors present and by the general background of the transaction.
Doubtless the Bureau will assume that prearrangement was present in
every transaction in which one member of a group buys property at or near
the date and at or near the price at which like property is sold by another nein-
ber. It should be possible to invalidate this assumption by establishing that
when the first member of the group bought or sold the other member did not
intend to take converse action, and thereafter did so independently of the
first member, and perhaps only in the light of later events such as a change in
economic or business circumstances. It is doubtful that the courts will sanction
the disallowance of losses in transactions which are actually free from prear-
rangement. The issue is factual, and it may be assumed that the Tax Court
will not be too sympathetic with attempted extensions of the lcrVilliarns
doctrine. 45
(d) Stock transfers prior to sale of the property in question.
Section 24(b) problems in connection with sales between an individual
and his controlled corporation, or between two controlled corporations, may
in some instances be eliminated by antecedent transfers of stock. The corpo-
rate stock distribution may he such that, prior to the stockholder's sale of
property to the corporation or the sale of its property to him (or the sale by
one corporation to another), the stockholder may be willing to enter into a
bona fide sale to an outsider or to a relative not listed in § 24(b) (2) (D), or
to have redeemed, enough of his stock to bring to 50 per cent or less the amount
which he is considered as owning. This might be accomiplished by bona fide
gi ft as well as by sale.
(e) Sales betwcen corporations.
Regardless of common control, sales between two corporations are free
of § 24(b) if neither corporation was a personal holding company (including
a foreign personal holding company) in its preceding taxable year. The
status or non-status as such a company on the date of the sale or exchange
45. This conclusion is based upon the Tax Court's decisions originally favorable
to the taxpayer in this field, and also by the reasoning in its memorandum decision
in the Saui case (note 39, supra), handed down after the Supreme Court decision in
AfcVillianrs.
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is irrelevant.46 It will in certain cases be desirable, and even necessary, to delay
the sale, in order that proper steps may be taken to insure that neither cor-
poration has personal holding company status for the year preceding the sale.
(f) Sale by or to an estate.
It would seem that an estate is not an individual within the meaning of
the provision disallowing loss from a sale or exchange between an individual
and'a corporation 50 per cent of the stock of which is owned by such individ-
ual.
The only decision on the foregoing point (Estate of Charles C. Ingalls 47)
reaches the conclusion that the loss is allowed, but does so upon the basis of
reasoning which is disturbing. In this case involving an estate's sale of bank
stock to a corporation more than 50 per cent controlled by the estate, the Tax
Court referred to the rule [§ 24(b) (2) (A)] that stock owned by an estate
shall be considered as being owned proportionately by its beneficiaries. The
court construed this rule as requiring it to look through the trust to determine
the indirect owners of the stock sold, whereupon it found that "the stock was
sold not by 'an individual,' but by a group of individuals, and, further, no 'such
individual' owned 'more than 50 percentum in value of the outstanding stock'
of the purchasing corporation." 48
The Tax Court reasoned differently as to § 24(b) (2) (A) in Lewis L.
Fawcett, where it said : 
4
Under the first three subparagraphs of paragraph (2), the ownership
of stock in a corporation, a party to the sale, is attributed to persons other
than the actual owners under certain circumstances. These provisions have
no reference to stock which is the subject of a sale or exchange.
It is believed that the later reasoning of the court, as contained in the
Fawcett opinion, is correct; and it is submitted that the court has inferentially
repudiated its statement in Ingalls that the stock sold by an estate is to be re-
garded under § 24(b) (2) (A) as having been owned and sold by the bene-
ficiaries.
(g) Transaction between fiduciary of one trust and beneficiary of another.
By its terms, § 24(b) (1) (F) relates to sales or exchanges "between a
46. See U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.24-6(b) (1943).
47. 45 B.T.A. 787 (1941), aff'd, 132 F.2d 862 (6th Cir. 1943).
48. Id. at 793; RABKIN AND JoniNSON, FEDERAL INCOME Gint AND ESTATE TAXA-
-non, S3 4 7 (1947) comments upon the Ingailt case as follows: "4 . . the Board indicated
that the loss could be disallowed if a beneficiary of the trust owned a 50% interest in the
property sold. This conclusion, it is submitted, was due to an erroneous interpretation
of the constructive ownership provisions of the statute; the latter provisions are to
be used only in determining whether the individual has the requisite stock ownership
in the corporations involved in the transfer, not in determining whether the individual
is a constructive owner of the property transferred."
49. 3 T.C. 308, 309 (1944).
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fiduciary of a trust and a beneficiary of such trust," and not to sales or ex-
changes between a fiduciary of one trust and a beneficiary of another trust,
even though both trusts were created by the same grantor. Moreover, § 24(b)
(1) (E) specifically provides for the disallowance of loss on sales or exchanges
between fiduciaries of separate trusts, "if the same person is a grantor with
respect to each trust." Application of standards of statutory construction
might dictate, therefore, that Congress specifically intended that transactions
between a fiduciary of one trust and a beneficiary of another trust, even though
the same person be grantor with respect to each trust, be free from § 24(b).
The question, however, has not yet been presented for decision to any
court. 60
In addition to the non-statutory tests of good faith discussed in subse-
quent sections of this paper, the application of the principle of Higgins v.
Smith 51 also should be considered. If one or both of the trust entities should
be disregarded as a sham or fiction, application of other paragraphs of
§ 24(b) (1) conceivably might operate to disallow loss between the persons
acting through the disregarded entities. 2
(h) Partial liquidation of a corporation.
Where the property transferred to a corporation is its own stock, spe-
cial circumstances exist. May loss disallowance be avoided in this case by con-
summating the transaction as a stock redemption in partial liquidation of the
corporation? There have been no decisions on this point.5 3 The statutory pro-
vision [§ 24(b) (1) (B) ], it should be noted, excepts losses in the cases of
distributions in liquidation.5 ' Under I.R.C. § 115(c), distributions in liquida-
tion may be in complete or partial liquidation of a corporation.' 5 Hence the
exception in § 24(b) appears broad enough to cover partial liquidations. The
Treasury, however, narrowly construes the term "partial liquidation," and re-
cent decisions under statutory provisions other than § 24(b) have tended to
support the Government's view. It is believed likely, nevertheless, that the
cancellation or redemption of all the stock of a stockholder, leaving neither him
nor a "member of his family" interested in the affairs of the corporation,"
50. See MERTENs, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 28.49, n.45 (1948).
51. Note 67, infra.
52. Cf: Shelden Land Company, 42 B.T.A. 498, 503 (1940).
53. In the Rubin case, note 9, supra, the Tax Court mentioned that no claim had
been made that the sale of taxpayer's stock to a corporation effected a liquidation of
the corporation.
54. The same exception is contained in § 24(b) (1) (C), generally disallowing loss
on sales between certain corporations if the same individual owns more than 50 per cent
of the outstanding stock of each.
55. See further the definition of "partial liquidation" in Int. Rev. Code § 115(i),
as read in connection with § 115(g), which treats some distributions in connection
with a cancellation or redemption of stock as essentially equivalent to the distribution
of a taxable dividend.
56. Cf. the following statement in U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.115-9 (1943) "... a
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would be considered as being within the exception in § 24(b) (1) (B) relating
to distributions in liquidation. A more difficult case under the exception is one
in which a "member of the family" of the transferring stockholder retains
stock in the corporation,57 particularly an amount in excess of 50 per centYs
(i) Liquidation of a partnership.
As above indicated, the statutory provisions disallowing loss on sales or
exchanges between individuals and their controlled corporations, or between
controlled corporations. specifically except "distributions in liquidation." The
natural assutmption is that this exception was intended to cover only distribu-
tions in liquidation of corporations. In the Whitney case,59 where a partnership
liquidated after selling assets to a corporation controlled by the partners, the
latter argued that the exception applied to the liquidation of the parnership.
The circuit court indicated that, assuming the exception did apply to the
liquidation of a partnership, the transaction between the partnership and the
corporation in this case nevettheless was a sale, which under the facts was
merely one of the steps in the liquidation of the partnership.
Another court already had held that loss from a sale in aid of corporate
liquidation and distribution was outside the statutory exception, which covered
only losses from the liquidating distribution itself.60
The partners also argued that each of them had sustained a loss upon
the partnership liquidation, measured by the adjusted cost of his interest
in the partnership and the amount (practically all in cash) which he received
in liquidation, and that section 24(b) did not apply to this loss. The circuit
court rejected this reasoning also, saying in part : 61
We do not think such deductions may be made by the individual tax-
payers either in the light of tie proper construction of § 24(b) (1) (B) or,
beyond that, as a proven loss upon the partnership investment. Since the
whole basis of the refusal of the deduction under § 24(b) (1) (B) is that
the transfer is not such a change of economic interest as to be considered
executed or closed to the point of realization of loss to the former owner,
there is nothing which wotld change the prohibition by the added fact, ob-
viously a usual one in tile situation, of termination of the partnership. There
cancellation or redemption by a corporation of all of the stock of a particular share-
holder, so that the shareholder ceases to be interested in the affairs of the corporation,
does not effect a distribution of a taxable dividend." In these circumstances, the trans-
action is treated as a partial liquidation under § lS(c).
57. Some tax practitioners prefer not to rely solely on the above-quoted sentence(note 56. supra) as protection against § 115(g), when close relatives of the transferring
stockholder retain a substantial block of stock in the corporation.
58. If the transaction effects a liquidation, it is within the statutory exception in§ 24(b) (1) (B), and the retention of stock by another member of the family should
make no difference. The question, of course, is whether the transaction is a liquidation.
On this, see the preceding note.
59 Note 24, supra.
60. Mathews v. Squire, 59 F, Supp. 827 (W.D. Wash. 1945).
61. Commissioner v. Whitney, 169 F.2d 562, 570 (2d Cir. 1948).
TAX DISALLOWANCE OF LOSS ON SALES
can be little reason for a transfer in substantial amount of firm assets to a
corporation except the substitution of the corporate way of doing business
for the former partnership one: and the prohilhition of § 24(b)(1)(13),
unless it is to be meaningless, iust be held to apply then equally or especial-
ly. But further, we do not see the basis for finding a partnership loss upon
this liquidation in any of the amounts stated ...
As the Commissioner suggests, since all adjustments of the partners'
interest or capital account are assumed to have been duly made, his in-
terest at dissolution would always equal his distrihutive cash. :\ctuallv any
additional loss must be a loss upon some specific property which then is
non-deductible under the circumstances here by reason of § 24(b) (1) (B).
The court's denial of a loss to the partners on their liquidation of the partner-
ship, as distinguished from the sale of the partnership assets, has been crit-
icized.862 It is possible that this problem has not been laid wholly at rest by the
Supreme Court's refusal to grant certiorari in the Whitney case.
(j) Avoidance of partnership status.
In determining whether § 24(b) applies when a corporation is a party
to a sale or exchange, as already explained, a stockholder is considered as own-
ing the stock of his "partner." Hence it is important that individuals not fall
unwittingly into partnership status.
In Homes Beautiful, Inc.,63 the corporate stock was owned by X (50%),
Y (25%), and Y's wife (25%). The corporation sold property to X and Y,
each assuming liability for one-half the purchase price, and the corporation
claimed a loss on the transaction. X and Y thereafter developed the property
and sold it at a profit. They claimed they were merely co-p)rchasers, but tie
Tax Court held that they had not overcome the Commissioner's findings that
they were partners. The corporation's loss was disallowed in toto, because
each of the purchasers was considered as owning the stock of tile other, so
that each owned more than 50 per cent.
To avoid partnership status for purposes of §24(b), it may be desirable
that individuals execute documents setting out in detail their relationship to
each other and to any jointly-owned property.
(k) Summary.
To safeguard tax losses, the best procedure is to sell to strangers. If the
taxpayer insists on selling to relatives or to corporations in which he, a mem-
ber of his family or his partner has an interest, a copy of § 24(b) had better
62. See THE TAx BARoMETFr, Vol. 5, para. 426, stating in part: ". . . taxpayers'
contention that they sustained losses on liquidation of the old firm merited far more
consideration than it received. The winding up of the old firm and the distribution of
its assets in cash was a closed transaction under Sec. 29.113(a)(I3)-2 of the regu-
lations. It is doubtful whether the mere continuation of the business in a corporation(in which others acquired a minority interest) requires disallowance of that loss."
63. P-H 1947 TC MIFmc, DEc. J 47,166 (19471.
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be kept at hand. The taxpayer may, without fear of § 24(b), sell to relatives
not deemed members of his family, friends, partners or other business as-
sociates, fellow-stockholders, fellow-beneficiaries of a trust or estate, many
other persons with whom he shares monetary or social interests, or to outsiders.
One controlled corporation may sell to another, and a parent corporation may
sell to a subsidiary, if in each instance neither corporation was a personal
holding company for its taxable year preceding the sale. All such sales free
of § 24(b), however, must be made in good faith. In addition, sales between
stockholder and corporation, or between controlled corporations, must have
a business purpose.
GOOD FAITH AND BUSINESS PURPOSE
Prior to the enactment of § 24(a) (6) of the l'cvenue Act of 1934 [the
predecessor to § 24(I) 1 losses from transactions between related taxpayers
and entities were disallowed tinder general principles inherent in the incoLiie
tax statute. These principles, and the decisions construing them, are still ii-
portant in so far as they apply to transactions falling outside § 24(b).
Consider the case of a sale between a parent corporation and its subsid-
iary, or between two corporations controlled or dominated by the same inter-
ests, and assume that § 24 (b) is inapplicable because neither corporation was a
personal holding company for its taxable year preceding the sale. Neverthe-
less the loss in each case may be disallowed under the general principles of
good faith and business purpose, inherent in the income tax statute, as en-
forced in the courts. In the application of these principles, the corporation
claiming the deduction may be required to answer a number of basic
questions, some of which overlap. The same would be true if the sale were
between related individuals, or between an individual and his corporation. The
major questions, under the heading of good faith, are as follows:
Recognizing the relationship between the two parties to be a highly
special one, precisely what was and is that relationship? Is the relationship
such that one would be unlikely to act independently of, and adversely to.
the other? Was the transaction of sale consummated at arms'-length, that
is, did the parties act in a business like manner, as would two unrelated
persons? Was the price a fair one? Did the transferee pay at once, or was
the transaction on credit ? If on credit, when did the transferee liquidate
its obligation, and from what source? If it paid at once, did it use funds
loaned or contributed by the transferor? If there was a loan from the trans-
feror, has the loan been repaid? If the transferor contributed the funds to
the capital of the transferee prior to the transaction, was the contribution
conditioned upon the money being used to acquire the property ? Did title
actually pass ? And did the dominion and control of the transferor accord-
ingly cease in a legal sense? In an economic sense ? Was the transaction
final, or was there an understanding, tacit or otherwise, that the property
would be reconveyed? Was it ever reconveyed? If so, for what price, and
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for what reason? What has been the history of similar transactions between
these parties, or between them and other related persons?
The answer to no single one of these questions will be decisive on the issue
of good faith, but the aggregate answers largely will be determinative.
Many of the points arising under the concept of good faith also are in-
volved under the concept of business purpose. Yet the two are essentially sep-
arate problems. Unlike the good faith issue, which may arise whenever a sale
is made to one not a stranger, the business purpose inquiry in this field largely
is limited to sales between an individual stockholder and his controlled cor-
poration, or between two corporations controlled by the same interests, or be-
tween parent and subsidiary corporation. A basic prolem in stch instances
is whether the transaction is business-motivated or tax-motivated. If tax-
motivated, the deduction for loss upon the sale may be disallowed, even though
all the customary indicia of good faith are present, and even though tax-moti-
vation normally is of no concern in a sale between individuals.
The business purpose doctrine in this field stems in material part from
the decision in Higgins v. Smith." In this case, the Supreme Court held that
a taxpayer did not sustain a deductible loss from a sale of securities to his
wholly owned corporation. The corporation. however, had been created and
-was operated under the taxpayer's control and direction to achieve tax ad-
vantages for its stockholder, and in carrying out the transaction in question,
the taxpayer had in mind the tax consequences to himself.
The Higgins v. Smith decision gave rise to three possible tests of de-
ductible loss:
First, the court said that: 6E "The Government may look at actualities and
upon determination that the form employed for doing business or carrying
out the challenged tax event is unreal or a sham may sustain or disregard the
effect of the fiction ......
Second. the court found a precedent in the Gregory case 66 "for the dis-
regard of a transfer of assets without a business purpose but solely to reduce
tax liability .. which I does] not vary control or change the flow of economic
benefits ..
Third, on trial, the jury found that the sale was not a transfer from the
taxpayer to something that existed separate and apart from him. The Supreme
Court found sufficient evidence to support this conclusion.
With respect to the first test, a number of cases have arisen since Higgins
v. Smith in which the Commissioner contended that a corporation, a party
to a sale or exchange, was unreal or a sham. In the first such case to
64. 308 U.S. 473 (1940).
65. Id. at 477.
66. Id. at 476.
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arise, the Smith of Higgins v. Smith, and his corporation, were again
involved, and the court concluded that the corporation "not only conducted
no business enterprise but had no justification for existence even as a holding
company." 6- It might, therefore, be reasoned that a corporation may not be
disregarded as a sham or unreal if it carries on legitimate business activity
This reasoning ig supported by recent statements of the Supreme Court, In
Moline Properties, Inc. v. Comm'r,6 s during the discussion of a related ques-
tion, the Court declared that where the purpose of a corporation "is the equiv-
alent of business activity or is followed by the carrying on of business by the
corporation, the corporation remains a separate taxable entity."
In National Investors' Corp. ;'. Ioy,6 9 Judge Learned Hand, speaking
for the court, asserted that "the gloss then [in Moline Properties, Inc.] put
upon Higgins v. Smith . . . was deliberate and is authoritative." In the Na-
tional Investors' Corp. case the Commissioner was denied the right to disallow
loss on a liquidation between jointly controlled companies, so long as the
second corporation carried on business activity. The Tax Court, too, has fol-
lowed the same reasoning. See Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co.70
Since Higgins v. Smith, there have been a number of decisions which fol-
low the second test in that case and therefore disregard sales made to con-
trolled companies for no purpose other than tax avoidance. In one, Continental
Oil Co. z'. Jons,71 sales were disregarded because found to have been made
by a refining corporation to its wholly owned distributing subsidiary for the
sole purpose of avoiding an excise tax. In another, Vickwire v. United States,7
stock sales were disregarded where made to a machinery manufacturing cor-
poration by two men. each of whom owned 47.5% of the stock of the corpora-
tion, the sales having been made for the sole ptrpose of achieving deductible
losses. Other courts have expressed their agreement that this is a proper in-
terpretation of Higgins v. Smith.
The Tax Court adopted this view in Crown Cork International Corp.73
In that case the taxpayer attempted to show an independent purpose for the
transaction, but the court rejected this evidence and concluded that the
only motive shown was tax savings.
In later decisions the Tax Court has applied this test for loss disallowance
as a matter of course, but twice recently this test has resulted in decisions for
the taxpayers. See Anderson, Clayton & Co. 74 and Brost Motors, Inc. 5
67. Commissioner v. Smith. 136 F.2d 556, 559 (2d Cir. 1943).
68. 319 U.S. 436, 439 (1943).
69. 144 F.2d 466, 467 (2d Cir. 1944).
70. 7 T.C. 211 (1946), acq. 1946-2 C.B.4.
71. 113 F.2d 557 (10th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 687 (1940).
72. 116 F.2d 679 (6th Cir. 1941).
73. 4 T.C. 19 (1944), aff'd, 149 F.2d 968 (3d Cir. 1945).
74. P-H 1948 TC MFaT. DEc. 48,162 (1948).
75. P-H 1948 TC ME.M. DFc. f 48,226 (1948).
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The third test of loss disallowance suggested by Higgins v. Smith is
whether the transferee has existence "separate and apart from" the transferor.
The court said: 76
Indeed this domination and control is so obvious in a wholly owned
corporation as to require a peremptory instruction that no loss in the stat-
utory sense could occur upon a sale by a taxpayer to such an entity.
The earlier decisions following Higgins v. Smith seem to have accepted
this language with little or no qualification. Further, as late as 1944, the Tax
Court relied upon this aspect of the decision to deny a loss deduction to a tax-
payer corporation which completely dominated and controlled its transferee
corporation. This was in the Crown Cork International case,77 already cited on
another point. However. in 1946, the Tax Court indicated that there must be
something more than complete domination and control of the transferee if
loss is to be disallowed. In Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. 87 the transferor
corporation owned all the stock of the transferee and had interlocking officers
and directors with it. Yet each corporation carried on a separate business as
a separate entity. On these facts, the court said: 79
. . . we are unable to find here that kind of domination and control
which would warrant a disregard of the separate corporate existence. . . .
A recent decision by the Supreme Court seems to have justified the Tax
Court's reluctance to apply the exact language of Higgins v. Smith. This was
in National Carbide Corp. v. Conmn'r. 0 In this case, a corporation wholly
owned several subsidiaries which in turn owned properties, purchased with
loans from the parent. The subsidiaries manufactured and sold related products
under contract with the parent requiring that they return to the parent all but
a nominal amount of income. The officials of the parent occupied similar po-
sitions in the subsidiaries, and the directors of the subsidiaries met only to
ratify the actions of the parent. The subsidiaries contended that they were
not taxable on the income turned over to the parent, and the Tax Court sus-
tained that contention upon the basis of the close relationship between the
parent and its subsidiaries. The court of appeals reversed, and the Supreme
Court agreed with it on the ground that: 81
76. 308 U.S. 473 at 475 (1940).
77. See note 73, supra.
78. See note 70, supra.
79. Id. at 217.
80. 336 U.S. 442 (1949).
81. Id. at 429.
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Complete ownership of the corporation, and the control primarily de-
pendent upon such ownership--the important ingredients of [Southern Pa-
cific Co. v. Lowe]-are no longer of significance in determining taxability.
On its face, National Carbide Corp. is not concerned with loss disal-
lowance between controlled companies. However. ,lloline Properties, I11., is
subject to the same cotmmient, and vet, as already noted, Judge Learned Hand
found it appropriate to say of language in that opinion "... the gloss then put
upon Higgins 7,. Smith .. .was deliberate and is authoritative." In support of
a similar interpretation of National Carbide Corp., it may be urged that the
Court therein treated Southern Pacific Co. v. Lo7Ve 82 as overruled by MIfoline
Properties, Inc. and proceeded to cite National Investors' Corp. v. Hoey with
approval. The presumed familiarity of the court with the relation of the prob-
lems involved, and the breadth of the language quoted above would lend ad-
ditional support to such an argument.
In any event, the Tax Court relied upon Southern Pacific v. Lote in de-
ciding Crownt Cork International Corp. At the least, therefore, the decision in
National Carbide Corp. will call for some re-examination of the Tax Court's
position in Crown Cork. It is believed that, in the light of recent cases, the
courts might properly abandon the separate entity test of Higgins v. Smith in
favor of the other two tests, particularly the business purpose test, since this
also will largely determine whether a corporate party to the transaction was
a sham or unreal.
Perhaps the results of the cited cases presently may be distilled roughly
as follows: To establish the loss deduction in this field, it should be shown;
(1 ) That the parties are separate from, and independent of, each other
to a degree which justifies the recognition of one as seller and the
other as buyer :
(2) That the particular transaction is in good faith, and
(3) \Vhere a corporation is a party, that the transaction is a business
transaction and is not motivated solely by tax considerations.
In establishing (1), (2), and (3), the proof tends to be the same, and there-
fore no particular effort will be made to maintain any segregation in respect
of these three elements in the course of the remaining comments.
One should study the tax and business background of the parties to the
transaction, ascertaining particularly whether they have in the past had simi-
lar dealings with each other or with any related individuals and corporations.
If they have, and these were not at arms'-length, the immediate problem is
made more complicated, for in these circumstances the tax authorities may
begin with the assumption that the present transaction is part of a pattern of
irregularities.
82. 247 U.S. 330 (1918).
TAX DISALLOWANCE OF LOSS ON SALES
The related parties should in all instances anticipate that they will be
asked to supply evidence as to the reality of the transaction, and should govern
themselves accordingly. Evidence of separate identity should be readily avail-
able, including charter provisions of corporations, the history as to their cre-
ation (particularly the purposes) and operations. their separate books, records,
corporate minutes, bank accounts, physical plant, methods of financing, etc.
If possible, the particular transaction should be consummated without borrow-
ings within the group of related taxpayers, although this is not essential. Where
two corporations are involved, it should be made clear, in so far as feasible,
that the officers and directors of each corporation considered the transaction
upon its merits. This is easier of accomplishment, of course, if the two corpo-
rations maintain separate organizations, and have entirely different officers
and directors. Even with much overlapping in the corporate organizations and
directorates, however, it still may be shown that in practice the two corpora-
tions could reach decisions independently of each other and independently of
their stockholders, and accordingly, that there was not such dominance and
control as to make the transaction unreal. Again, the background will be of
help in this aspect. If the original organization and separation of the two
corporations was for a business purpose, and the transaction in question was
also for a business purpose, and was consummated upon terms fair to both
parties, the dominance and control of one party by the other (or dominance
and control by common interests) seems to lose much of its significance in the
eyes of the courts. There is in these circumstances a disposition to view the
corporations as separate entities and to conclude that the transaction is marked
by the requisite finality. This is true also of transactions between a corpora-
tion and an individual stockholder.
Conversely, even when there is independent management of the corpora-
tion or corporations, a loss from a transfer within the related group is not
recognized as real and final if the transfer lacks a business purpose. Hence,
in this type of transaction one cannot overestimate the importance of having
a clearly defined and unassailable business purpose, as distinguished from a
tax purpose.
If, onl the other hand, continuing beneficial ownership of property is not
involved, as where one sells at a fair price to a complete stranger, the purpose
of the transaction is totally irrelevant, even though the seller's sole purpose be
the taking of a tax deduction.
Good faith, which must always be present, is further evidenced by fair
terms and a fair price, viewed from either side of the transaction. When the
market value of the property at the time of the proposed transaction is not defi-
nitely known and publicly accepted. it is generally wise to have an evaluation
made by independent appraisers, whose opinion will be respected by the courts.
Finally, there should be nothing in the terms of transfer, or in the surround-
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ing circumstances, indicating that the transferor intends to recapture the prop-
erty with the cooperation of an amenable transferee.
In summary, losses from bona fide sales or exchanges between related
taxpayers generally will be allowed, if § 24(b) is inapplicable. In the case of
a transaction between a corporation and its stockholders, or between coi-
trolled corporations, a business purpose is necessary. In some instances, more-
over, the commissioner may under § 45, I.R.C., reallocate the loss anoiig the
related taxpayers.
